Hiiraan Online

Ethiopia’s ambition to either annex Somalia entirely or take a portion of its territory has been a central component of its foreign policy since since the beginning of the last  century; though some, like Somali novelist Nuruddin Farah, trace it back to “the ghostly figures” of Yohannis and Menelik in the 17th and 19th centuries respectively. “Nowadays,” Farah said, “the players on the political scene in the Somali peninsula may be different. Yet, the wish on the part of Ethiopia to make a claim one way or another to the coast or to have easy access to it continues.” He wrote those words in 1978. Five decades on and policy makers in Addis Ababa are still thinking in much the same terms. Back then they had a weak grip on Eritrea as it fought doggedly for its independence. Today Ethiopia is landlocked and is more forcefully staking its claim.  

Five decades on and policy makers in Addis Ababa are still thinking in much the same terms. Back then they had a weak grip on Eritrea as it fought doggedly for its independence. Today Ethiopia is landlocked and is more forcefully staking its claim. 

Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza, coupled with rising tensions in the Red Sea region, has emboldened Ethiopia to revive its irredentist ambitions and adopt a more aggressive posture towards Somalia. This comes at a time when Somalia is increasingly fragmented, and its political elite are more divided than ever. Abiy Ahmed senses the international community is distracted with other matters and has decided the time is right to attempt to press this claim and deliver at least one “victory” following years of chaotic and very damaging leadership.  

“A population of 150 million cannot live in a geographic prison,” he declared in parliament, implying that being landlocked justifies aggressive territorial claims on neighbouring countries. In another parliamentary session, Abiy made a different uninhibited and threatening remark, stating: “this is a big country with a big army and big people.” Ethiopia, Abiy is convinced, must secure access to the sea—whether through negotiations or, as the rhetoric suggests, potentially by force. 

Prime minister Abiy, who had a very close relationship with the previous Somali government, is not inclined to extend the same benefit of the doubt to Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the current President of Somalia, despite Mohamud’s own past close ties with the previous Ethiopian governments.  

During President Mohamud’s first term, Ethiopia gained significant political leverage over the Somali state, enabling it to shape the federal structure, appoint governors, ministers, and mayors, and exert influence over Somali politics. In many ways Mohamud’s initial term set the scene for the situation we see unfolding now with the memorandum. Ethiopia remains aware that the central government in Mogadishu struggles to control the entire Somali territory and has extremely strained relations with key regions such as Somaliland, Puntland, Jubbaland, and South-West state. 

Ethiopia remains aware that the central government in Mogadishu struggles to control the entire Somali territory and has extremely strained relations with key regions such as Somaliland, Puntland, Jubbaland, and South-West state. 

Ethiopia has signed a controversial military pact with Somaliland in this context, which according to the limited statements that have reached the public will give Ethiopia either permanent access to an Ethiopian naval base along Somaliland’s Gulf of Aden coast or a 50 year lease. Somaliland officials have said Ethiopia will break its international isolation, grant it recognition and a share of Ethiopian Airlines in return for land.  

President Hassan’s weak domestic authority was further exposed when, after this ill-advised pact, he ordered the closure of Ethiopia’s informal embassies in Somaliland and Puntland. This decree was publicly defied by both regions, with Puntland following Somaliland’s lead by unilaterally signing its own set of agreements with Ethiopia. Garowe also later announced that it was cutting ties with the federal government over a new constitution it objects to.  

The sovereignty mirage    

If the term sovereignty refers to the political concept denoting the supreme authority and responsibility of an independent state to protect its borders and govern its internal and external affairs without foreign interference, then Somalia is far from achieving true sovereignty. I apologise if this contradicts the political rhetoric promoted by the current government and its supporters. The campaign slogan of the government in 2022 was: “Somalia at peace with itself, and at peace with the world.” Unfortunately, Somalia is not at peace and with its borders now vulnerable it definitely isn’t at peace with the world. It is not independently funding its security apparatuses or governmental institutions and relies on the charity of the international community.  

Since December 1992, Somalia has been effectively governed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN task force was entrusted with overseeing Somalia’s humanitarian efforts, security, governance, political processes, constitutional reforms, and rule of law. For over three decades, Somalia’s sovereignty has effectively been delegated to this UN task force, with the only cosmetic changes and new acronyms. The latest iteration is UNSOM, which serves as Somalia’s de facto deep state. Its mandate formally expires in October this year. Let us see what comes next.  

The Somali state may be dysfunctional at many levels, but it is neither a threat to world peace nor a rogue regime that actively violates international law. Its primary challenge lies in the absence of visionary leadership with the political will to prioritise a genuinely Somali-owned reconciliation process, sever the dependency on external actors, and develop a diplomatic strategy to reclaim its sovereignty from the UN.  

The Turko-Egyptian element of the equation  

Turkiye has established a substantial commercial, military, and political presence in the Horn of Africa. In Mogadishu, officials regard Turkey as one of their key partners in security, state-building, and humanitarian efforts. Diplomatic relations between the two capitals were revived in 2011 after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Mogadishu, marking the first visit by a non-African leader since Somalia’s state collapse in the early 1990s. These relations have since flourished, culminating in a new ten-year defence agreement signed earlier this year. This pact allows the Turkish navy to patrol and safeguard Somalia's territorial waters, as well as assist in training and equipping Somalia’s skeletal naval forces. Turkiye also signed an offshore oil and gas exploration deal with Somalia.  

In Ethiopia however, Turkiye’s presence is also pronounced. An anonymous Turkish official told TRT World that Ankara views Ethiopia as a part of the “greater Middle East.” “Any instability in Ethiopia can spread to other regions, having consequences across the Middle East.” Turkey and Ethiopia signed a military cooperation agreement in the summer of 2021 as Tigrayan forces bore down on Addis Ababa which successfully rolled back the offensive.  

Turkiye also has a large commercial presence in Ethiopia and Turkish businesses operate across the Ethiopian economy. FDI from Turkey in Ethiopia is second only to China with $2.5 billion investment capital. Turkish officials refer to Ethiopia as a “brotherly” country with whom they enjoy historical ties dating back to the late 19th century during the reigns of Sultan Abdulhamid II and Emperor Menelik II.  

Turkiye has sought to leverage its influence with both countries to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the dispute, which threatens to undermine its achievements in the region. Two rounds of talks, mediated by the good offices of foreign minister Hakan Fidan, have successfully brought the parties back to the negotiating table but have yet to produce any tangible results. A third round is scheduled for September, but I fear it will amount to little more than an exercise in futility unless Ethiopia’s aggression towards Somalia is directly addressed. 

Egypt, with which Ankara has patched up its ties, has more directly inserted itself into the maelstrom. Somalia has reheated its ties with Cairo, once a key actor in the Horn of Africa region, which has its own dispute with Ethiopia over GERD. In January, Mohamud visited Egypt seeking its support. In a statement to reporters after their meeting Abdel Fatah al-Sisi said: “My message to Ethiopia is that trying to seize a piece of land to control it is something no one will agree to.” Many initially thought it was bluster, but the Egyptians have delivered a defence pact, military aid and sent a division of its special forces to Somalia. This weekend Hamza Barre travelled to Cairo to visit his counterpart Mustafa Madbouly who said achieving Somali unity was one of Egypt’s “top priorities.”  

Ethiopia has said it won’t “stand idle while other actors are taking measures to destabilise the region” whereas Somaliland literally used the same words as the Ethiopian statement (“will not stand idle”) and said it also “strongly objects” to the Egyptian deployment. A new platform for a new proxy war is set as some units within the Somali armed forces in Gedo and Hiiraan regions have publicly pledged allegiance to “defend Ethiopia against the Egyptian aggression.” 

Willful blindness  

President Mohamud has been striking the right rhetorical chords, but when it comes to taking the necessary actions against a hostile neighbour, domestic challenges, and the foreign powers undermining his objectives, his words amount to little more than hot air. 

As the most seasoned Somali politician, and the only one to have been elected president twice since Aden Abdulle Osman in the 1960s, he knows that he lacks the popularity and credibility to rally the public against Ethiopian aggression. His persistent warnings of an existential threat are overshadowed by the reality that the enemy is already within. 

Now in the third year of his four-year term, President Mohamud faces the consequences of political miscalculations that have led to deadlocked processes and inter-clan conflicts. His flawed strategy of arming clan militias to fight al-Shabaab has rekindled clan warfare, resulting in Somalia’s fragmentation into several clanistans with leaders more focused on undermining each other for political survival than a genuine national vision to rejuvenate the country.  

It’s impossible to defend sovereignty that one doesn’t possess. No leader or commission can reclaim sovereignty with vague policies, inconsistent politics, and selective implementation. Likewise, no foreign nation can  truly defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another in a sustainable manner. A nation dependent on external protection is not sovereign. 

If President Mohamud is serious about his claims, he must place peace among Somalis at the forefront of his agenda. The current situation has only arisen due to the failure of Mogadishu and Hargeisa to reconcile their differences, with Ethiopia merely taking advantage of this rift. Somalia now faces the risk of partial annexation. There is no such thing as a “peace express” or a quick fix to resolve the ongoing disputes with Hargeisa, particularly in light of the recent memorandum. The hard work needs to start now or both Hargeisa and Mogadishu will hang separately and be resigned to a future of vassalised statehood.