Hiiraan Online

Is Somalia drinking mixing tobacco with water if Somalia’s humanitarian responses has always been considered a state of complex emergency and protracted crisis characterized mainly by persistent conflicts, massive internal and external displacement, environment degradation, food insecurity, market volatility and markets failures, unregulated private sector, high degree of vulnerability, absence of institutional, social and physical infrastructure, lack of social service delivery and many other indicators typical of a “failed” state. As a result of this situation Somalia ranks among the five least developed countries in the world.

In 2009 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for Somalia has increased the funding size from $662 million in 2008 to $900 million for 2009. The justification of this new pledge indicated that the number of people requiring humanitarian and emergency livelihood support almost doubled during 2008, increasing by 77% from 1.8 million in January to more than 3.2 million by July 2008. CAP for 2010

Last year 2009 USAID provided over $159 million in assistance through international nongovernmental organizations and United Nations agencies. This funding consisted of $150 million for humanitarian assistance programs, $9 million funding to support agriculture and food security, economic recovery and market systems, health, nutrition, protection, and water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions. USAID FOR 2009

The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department has been in the system of aid intervention; the allocation of funds reached 46 million Euros in humanitarian aid for Somalia (2008) and had an additional €18 million for 2009.

These are the major Somalia donors contracting United Nations agencies and international NGOs to be the implementation partners of various projects in my home country. While these funds sound reasonable to respond affectively the Humanitarian tremor on Somalia has been poorly coordinated by midfielders in Nairobi, the implementation partners (the midfielders) have succeeded to implement different policies and politics in the use of humanitarian name.

It’s publically observed the negative impacts of some International policies and politics in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia deepened in the situation, illuminating why Somalia has been bedevilled by such persistent humanitarian crises, high rates of failure and frustration. I say special importance are the international political interests shaping external responses to Somalia’s humanitarian crises, and the particular international policies meant to cope with Somalia’s problems.

Most of its existence as an independent state, Somalia been perceived as strategically important by major powers. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the West vied for influence in the Horn of Africa. Political aid comparism 1968

 More recently, America’s preoccupation with counter-terrorism has again made the country a top strategic priority. According to newafrican magazine published in June 2008, Somalia has what the World Bank calls the number one commercial oil supply, geostrategically located with ports and naval access. Europeans are not absent to struggle through any manner n this involvement.    

Evidence shows that the external strategies and interventions that have helped to shape Somalia have prolonged humanitarian crisis, there are two main conclusions.

First, the Somali crisis is increasingly driven by the interests and policies of foreign actors. In the latter half of the 1990s, when Somalia was generally given negligible attention by the international community, one could make the case that the ongoing crises in the country were mainly the product of internal factors – clannism, spoilers and intolerant leadership. These internal constraints may still be present, but they are overshadowed by the impact that external factors now have in Somalia. At least for the time being, Somalis have less control over their political fate than at any time in the past 20 years.

This factor remind me when I came as consultant in lokichoggio town in Kenya, small town that all the humanitarian organizations for southern Sudan stationed for the response to the complex  emergency aid and continuous humanitarian crises, in my view it was a viable idea to show how serious the operation is. I asked myself why the midfielders fail to have similar idea to install the Somalia operation base in Mandera, instead of spending millions of dollars for humanitarian response in one of most expensive cities in Africa (Nairobi).

When the deal of signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between government of Sudan and SPLM in southern Sudan. Juba city became the capital of the South, all the humanitarian agencies structured in Juba. Then I had another assignment in Juba, I observed enormous presence of humanitarian organizations shifted from Kenya, and even political offices from major powers swamped in Juba though the capacity of accommodation spaces were squeezing.

In this faculty, and side of stability measurement, Hargeysa, Somaliland, had better stability, and capacity of recommendable infrastructure to accommodate all the humanitarian agencies for Somalia, including logistic access off the sea, but the midfielders failed to detect it.

The current political progress in Somalia has yet to translate into safety for externals, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance remains difficult for all but not forgotten. The experienced and well established Somali organizations have not been tested as donor partners, the midfielders claim that these organizations have less capacity to deliver assistance while accountability for these NGOs will not be strong-willed. I would suggest unless you have compatible strategy, proper mechanism, and transparent accountability systems it’s unprofessional to deteriorate the efficiency and the effectiveness of a service provider for objectives frailer.

We are talking about humanitarian tremor, beyond humanitarian crises, it’s impossible to negotiate the delivery methodology, the response timeframe, the cost effectiveness. There is a need to come up with a massive response that comes from gross roots organizations with the support from the main donors. To achieve this, there should be flexible approach and increased close collaboration and partnership with Somali organizations, community based organizations and then a common feature of successful operations could be perceptible. These gross root organizations may hold in-depth access in the communities, faster intervention, problem negotiation and solving skills, risk awareness capability, cost delivery effectiveness, and cohesive approach with all authorities. 

The Somalia donors need to reconsider the humanitarian strategy and develop new way of  tangible intervention, the more there is delay of intervention the more Somalia will have more insecurity, even stable areas could be more fragile.

Active humanitarian and affective implementation could lead stability since food security contributes stability. Its time for authentic intervention and discontinue mixing tobacco with water, generously, the Somalia situation is taking far then expected if this could not be massively responded. 

The logic intervention as stated is to be sustainable improvement of the Somali people and good governance resulting.

The Somali organizations should review their agenda and wake up for the sake of the Somali people, coming together as union of Somali NGO, they should postpone the divisions among them created by whoever and trace the way of response from this humanitarian tremor. The Somalia Ministry of National planning should take leading role for cohesive and coordination policy review on strengthening the national agenda n Humanitarian responses.