Monday June 9, 2025
By Mohamed Muse Hassan
Somali Danab soldiers await their next orders during urban operations training at Justified Accord 2024 (JA24) in Nanyuki, Kenya Feb. 28, 2024. CREDIT / Leron Richards
The recent testimonies before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Joshua Meservey of the Hudson Institute and Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations underscore a growing concern in Washington: The Horn of Africa is teetering between breakdown and opportunity. Yet both testimonies, in different ways, suggest that the United States should begin to scale down its expectations for a unified Somalia and instead work with its federal member states or other localized actors. That path, while appealing in its pragmatism, is ultimately self-defeating. It is perilous for U.S. interests.
Let me be clear: Somalia is not an easy partner. The road to democratic consolidation and security sector reform has been frustratingly slow, corruption is endemic, and al-Shabaab remains a serious, active threat. But walking away from the idea of a strong, unified Somalia, however imperfect, is not a neutral act. It is a strategic retreat that invites more assertive global actors to fill the void, fracturing the country further and weakening a potentially vital partner for the United States in the Horn of Africa.
Disintegration Is Not a Strategy
Meservey's testimony advocates a pivot away from Mogadishu and toward federal member states, even suggesting that the effort to build a central government is a “failed experiment.” This perspective, while grounded in some hard truths, misses a crucial point: disintegration is not a strategy. Working around the federal government might yield short-term gains in counterterrorism coordination, but it undermines the long-term goal of building a capable Somali state that can secure its own territory, manage its borders, and represent its people.
The alternative is a fragmented Somalia made up of autonomous regions competing for resources, power, and legitimacy. This scenario is tailor-made for exploitation by outside powers. It will empower not just terrorist networks but also state actors like Iran, the UAE, and even Russia and China. All of these actors have demonstrated a willingness to play in Somalia’s fractured political space. Encouraging fragmentation undercuts the very national institutions that could serve as bulwarks against these encroachments.
Disintegration Is an Already-Tested—and Failed—Trial
The proposition that the U.S. should bypass the Federal Government of Somalia and work directly with local actors is not a novel idea—it is a recycled strategy that has already been tested and has failed with lasting consequences.
In 2005, the United States, in its effort to combat terrorism in Somalia, chose to support warlords under the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism. This decision was made despite the existence of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), a fledgling but legitimate authority. The warlords' brutality and corruption deeply alienated the Somali population, leading to a backlash that empowered the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which successfully expelled warlords from Mogadishu in June 2006.
Rather than supporting the peace process in Khartoum between the TFG and the ICU—an opportunity to form a unified Somali state—the U.S. government supported Ethiopia's military intervention to remove the ICU from power. This short-sighted approach derailed the peace process, discredited moderates, and directly led to the emergence of al-Shabaab, which would grow into one of the most lethal al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations in the world.
Nearly two decades later, Somalia and the international community are still contending with the consequences of that decision. Billions of dollars have been spent, thousands of lives lost, and the region remains unstable. These tragic outcomes were not inevitable—they were the result of policy choices that ignored the importance of building a legitimate, strong Somali state.
The lesson is clear: working around central authority and empowering fragmented actors does not bring security—it breeds extremism, weakens institutions, and compromises regional stability. Somalia's future, and by extension the region's security, depends on sustained investment in its national government and institutions.
The High Cost of Disengagement
Both Gavin and Meservey describe a region where strategic competitors are already deeply invested. Iran is restoring relations and sending drones. Turkey operates a military base in Mogadishu. The UAE is building influence through economic deals and private security forces. China watches patiently, laying down infrastructure and political capital in equal measure.
If Somalia is seen as too broken to hold together, it will not be left alone. It will be carved into spheres of influence. Every moment of U.S. disengagement is a signal to these powers that Somalia is fair game. This should alarm American policymakers. Somalia’s coastline touches some of the most vital maritime corridors in the world. Its stability, or lack thereof, affects Red Sea commerce, Indian Ocean shipping routes, and the growing strategic calculus of the Gulf states. A strong Somali state, even an imperfect one, is better positioned to manage this geopolitical pressure than a fragmented shell of federal units with no cohesive policy or defense structure.
A Strategic Investment, Not a Charity Case
Support for Somalia’s state-building project should not be viewed as a humanitarian handout. It is a strategic investment. A functioning Somali state aligned with Western norms, however slowly it develops, is in America’s national security interest. It creates a platform for regional cooperation on counterterrorism, limits the operating space of extremist actors, and offers a partner to engage in trade and energy development. Just as importantly, it sends a message to rivals that the U.S. will not abandon the region to authoritarian influence and proxy warfare.
What Real Strategic Vision Looks Like
Yes, the U.S. needs to refine its approach. It must work with civil society, religious leaders, women’s networks, and youth groups—not just politicians in Villa Somalia. It must apply pressure on corruption and demand accountability in aid and security assistance. But it must do so with the end goal of strengthening Somalia’s cohesion, not circumventing it.
Gavin calls for a Red Sea regional strategy, and she's right. But that strategy must include a coherent Somali pillar. A weak or fragmented Somalia invites regional instability and foreign meddling. A strong Somalia, imperfect as it may be, can be a cornerstone of a more stable Horn.
The U.S. does not have the luxury of lowering its ambitions in Somalia without consequence. The region is shifting fast. Rivals are watching. Partners are hedging. America must decide whether it wants a Somalia that is united, sovereign, and stable, or one that is divided, vulnerable, and ripe for exploitation.
The choice is ours. And the clock is ticking.
Mohamed Muse Hassan is the First Secretary at the Embassy of Somalia to the United States