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by Daud Ed Osman
Rochester, MN
Tuesday, February 03, 2009
The consensus that has emerged after two years of Ethiopian invasion and brutal occupation is that, clan politics is discredited, and as a result, warlordism, irrationalism, and primitive politics have become, thing of the past. However, the emergency of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in the summer of 2006 was a culmination of socio-political transformation that began in early 1980’s. The confrontation between UIC and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) – which has been an alliance of clan warlords - in the summer of 2006 was the second major confrontation between the two groups – the first being fought in 1992 by Somali Salvation of Democratic Front (SSDF), and Al-Itahad Al Islami (II) in what is now known as autonomous region of Puntland.
However, the emergency of the UIC as popular grass root organization, with political and military prowess, and its defeat of notorious clan warlords, demonstrated that, the Islamists won the war of ideas, as well as the hearts and minds of the new generation of young people, who grow up, and became disillusioned, with the irrationality, and irreconcilability of clan differences, and clan warlords repugnance towards civility, reconciliation, compromise.
The most analysts of Somali politics fail to understand the nature of the insurgency, let along predict dismal failure of Ethiopian adventure, or the incompetence of TFG. They did not recognize the paradigm shift, and continued to employ the outdated clan framework, instead of focusing demographic shift and political ideology. Indeed most of these analysts underestimated the sophistication, the discipline, resilience, vigor, and the commitment of the insurgency.
If one looks the swift victory of the UIC, as well as the trends that emerged for the last two years, the country is divided in to two - an equal - political camps: the first group is composed of the impotent clan warlords, and their underdog allied traditional clan leaders – without loyal constituents, and lack of unifying purpose, represented by the pre-Djibuti Transitional Federal Government. The second group consists of the youth, the Islamists, and new generation of business elites, who have been marginalized from politics for so long, and don’t expect clan warlords to improve their quality of living, with Conviction, commitment, and a unifying cause, represented by the insurgency. In order for these analysts to grasp the new dynamics, they must change the outdated clan framework.
The clan politicians or the warlords in the TFG, regardless of their clan, have become delusional; they view the insurgency as one sub clan’s conspiracy to dominate Somalia. The whole idea of Ethiopian invasion was not to stabilize the country, but to rescue them from that powerful clan. In addition, according to their point of view, the popular leaders of the insurgency who don’t belong that sub clan are viewed as paid agents who are there to advance that sophisticated sub clan’s interests. Thus, they view the mainstream media such as British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Somali Service, Voice of America (VOA) Somali language, and other local media in Mogadishu, the capital city, as a part of conspiracy, and mouth piece of that sub clan.
That point of view has been guiding TFG’s policy for the last two years, and they are reflected on their irrational actions. In the summer of 2007 they held national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, that brought their allied traditional clan elders, to reinforce their denial, and failed to accept the fact that, the insurgency is not another clan, but a popular movement to confront the protracted clan anarchy, and warlordism, and the end of zero sum politics.
However, this conference was the first test of the TFG by its donor countries, and the result has not pleased these donors, and led to revise, and change their policies which led to bring moderate Islamists who want to participate in political process in government. Of course, there are others who choose violence without even finding what they disagree with the new government.
The insurgency need to understand that their way is not Islamic way, and if their way which is more war, bloodshed, poverty, hanger, destruction, ignorance, diseases, as to what happen in Afghanistan in the 1990’s after the Islamists defeated the Soviet troops, instead of applying the intension of the Shariah, which is the protection of people’s religious believes, their live, their property, their dignity and honor, and protect their families from any physical or psychological harm. We all agree that what happened in Afghanistan in the 1990’s has nothing to do about Islam. Similarly, waging unnecessary war against African union troops in Somalia, lack the wisdom, and the reflection, that Quran encourages its believers always use.
There are many reasons to be optimistic after the Ethiopian regime ended their aggression, and withdraw their troops from Somalia. First, the insurgency is not a homogenous group that blindly flow one school of thought or uniformly sanction one method of interpretation. They include moderates, literalists, and extremists, but they all have one thing in common: they are more likely honest, predictable, relatively educated, less corrupt, disciplined, selfless, loyal to their superiors, and in search of stability and order. These characteristics help them to confront, the Ethiopian military that had more fire power, and intelligence, and withstood international political pressure.
However, the election of the new president Sheikh Sharrif Sheikh Ahmed in Djibouti is not the end of reconciliation process, and he is very aware of that, as he pointed out in his speech last week. The job of the new president is to seize the moment, and his first task is to bring his former colleagues in the insurgency including Al-Shabbab, civil society, business, intellectuals, Islamic scholars, women’s groups, and expatriates, in to a national unity government. The success of the new president depends on how he wages the war of ideas, and to use a concept in Islam, to call them to “come back the bigger Jihad” the jihad for self disciplines, charity, service to the community, to be just even to those with other faith, and accept their social responsibility. It is taping the youth’s energy, and channeling it to the Peace Building, State Building, and development projects.
As we have seen the rhetoric of the Al-Shabbab, they still in the “Small Jihad Mode,” they must be brought in the new context of post Ethiopian invasion, and Nation Building, and the best way to achieve that is to approach the Islamic Scholars who give them the “Fatwa” to engage Self defense Jihad, to issue a new Fatwa that reflects the new context, which is the need for “Bigger Jihad,” that highlights, civility, patience, justice, honest, responsibility, hard work, thrifty, prudent, tolerance, order, and faithfulness. Any peace process that fails to reflect with these realities will be doomed to fail.
Daud Ed Osman
Rochester, MN
Can be reached at: [email protected]