Framing Peace in Somalia: The Djibouti Agreement

by Rashid Yahya
Wednesday, June 11, 2008

“I never saw an instance of one or two disputants convincing the other by argument”

                                                                                                                                   Thomas Jefferson

 

The Djibouti peace agreement, with all its defects and omissions, must be hailed as an important milestone towards achieving peace in Somalia. Given the grim realities on the ground and the pitiful condition of our people, any relief from the madness and despair of the last 20 years is absolutely a ray of hope that we must cling onto lest we drift back into the abyss, again.

 

Many Somalis will react positively to this peace agreement though with a measure of skepticism, and rightfully so, wondering if the terms and conditions set forth in this accord were not tilted to benefit Ethiopia and the TFG, thus questioning if it can come to fruition. Nevertheless, for whatever it holds, the promise of peace is so urgent and vital for the fate of our nation, careful evaluation and honest judgment is indispensable if we are ever to reverse the woeful state of our country. We must suspend polarizing our differences and look for what exists between the extremes.

 

The accomplishments of the ARS representatives are not a small feat. Securing a fundamental national desire to rid Somalia of the Ethiopian occupation forces is a significant and a historic achievement which will change the course of events in Somalia if this peace deal materializes. clauses A and B of Article 7, call the UN deploy international stabilization force “from countries that are friends of Somalia excluding neighboring states,”  and that “Within a period of 120 days of the signing of this agreement the TFG ----- the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its troops from Somalia after the deployment of a sufficient number of UN Forces.”

 

One can only imagine how difficult this must have been for the TFG to consent to those terms, given its existential dependency on Ethiopia. Nonetheless, one must also qualify the ambiguity in the language of clause B. Word for word, it states that “the TFG will act in accordance with the decision that has already been taken by the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its troops from Somalia after the deployment of a sufficient number of UN Forces.”

 

One may ask, what Ethiopian decision? Has this Ethiopian decision to withdraw its forces already been made? Does the clause mandate the TFG to bless Ethiopia’s decision to withdraw its forces? Why does not the TFG or for that matter the UN ask Ethiopia to withdraw its forces?

 

Furthermore, how much is “a sufficient number?” Is it 1,000 or 10,000 or may be 100,000 UN forces? Who determines adequacy of the forces; is it the TFG, the ARS, or a joint decision or perhaps the UN itself?

 

Never in the history of mankind has the strong objectively negotiated with the weak. There is no incentive to be engaged in an exhaustive discourse of  give-and- take  and deal making compromises. As long as there are Ethiopian tanks in Mogadishu, the TFG will not engage in a meaningful dialogue with the opposition.

 

If indeed there is sincerity in this endeavour, why the language in one of the thorniest and most contentious issue fuelling the conflict in Somalia is not spelled out with more clarity and specificity?

 

Apparently, whatever went in that negotiation room, one can only appreciate the degree of persuasion and the enormous political pressure which ARS reps were brought upon to bear through cajoling or coercion, to accede to what can only be interpreted as a total and complete surrender.

 

Take for instance clause C of Article 7 which selectively requires that “The ARS shall, through a solemn public statement, cease and condemn all acts of armed violence in Somalia and dissociate itself from any armed groups or individuals that do not adhere to the terms of this Agreement.” Compliance with this clause, without reciprocity from the TFG or the Ethiopian occupation force, not only criminalizes legitimate resistance but unequivocally endorses the TFG as the rightful and sole sovereign authority of the land, while denying the ARS its lawful role of peace maker as an equal partner. Thence; the opposition’s failure to see complex issues eye-to-eye, ratify TFG policies or initiatives, no matter how sincere the disagreements are, could become grounds for breach of contract. It is very disturbing that such powers and legitimacy be unquestioningly bestowed upon a group whose track record in establishing legitimacy or seeking genuine peace is severely compromised.

 

Additionally, in what can only be a conscious display of bias, the draft language of Article 3, the primary requirement of the agreement, quotes directly the TFG president in verbatim; “avoid a security vacuum” to indirectly validate extension of the illegal occupation and assuage the primordial fear the TFG has of Ethiopia’s departure from Somalia. Rather, it would have been more proper if the UN had impressed upon the transitional government to earn its legitimacy by doing the people’s work instead of ruling from the turrets of Ethiopian tanks.

 

Evidently, the most venomous issue fueling the conflict in Somalia is the desire of one group or an alliance of groups, however few in number they may be, to dominate the rest. The complete and systematic denial of the birth right of communities to govern and manage their daily local affairs for political and material gain naturally entails the use of force and coercion. In this instance; the TFG’s ploy to pursue those ends using an arch enemy of Somalia further inflames the situation and makes the task of peace virtually impossible to sustain under current conditions.

 

Establishment of a  joint security committee from both parties, as stipulated in Article 8, is re-assuring and will serve to introduce a sense of checks and balances, if its implementation is vigorously supported by an impartial stabilization force from friendly nations that have no political or strategic stake in the affairs of Somalia.

 

Somalis, a people of one ethnicity, one mother tongue, one faith and a vast beautiful land can coexist peacefully to enjoy and  reap the fruits of a durable, just and lasting peace. But leaders with narrow and short sighted political vision and petty clannish divisions have allowed conditions to escalate into gross, wasteful calamities that could have been avoided if only the legitimate rights of every constituency was respected and protected, while advancing and promoting sensible national policies and not divisiveness. but advocated that we are part of a larger whole.

 

In conclusion, for whatever it is worth, if this agreement succeeds in calming the nerves and paves the way to establishing an environment of trust building and cooperation, then buy all standards it would be considered a triumph. The two (2) Sheriffs and the Prime Minister, Mr. Nur Adde, are the most rational and peace loving actors on today’s political stage and therefore hold the best hope to usher peace and restore Somalia to what it can and must be. One nation, anchored in brotherhood, justice and equality and guided by a strong righteous faith and enduring trust in our ability to overcome every hurdle and uncertainty.

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Rashid Yahya Ali

Baltimore, USA

E-mail: [email protected]