Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Thursday May 31, 2018
In an interview with the Africa Center, Simon Mulongo, deputy to the AU Commission in Mogadishu, says that AMISOM’s gains could never have been realized if it had continued to rely on the traditional peacekeeping template.
An AMISOM field commander in front of an armored personnel carrier.
In 2017, Somalia held parliamentary and presidential elections in a
relatively stable atmosphere. The African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM), which has been deployed to Somalia since 2007, has been a key
factor in realizing this milestone. Nonetheless, al Shabaab, the
militant Islamist group that has been destabilizing Somalia, remains a
serious threat. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies spoke to Simon
Mulongo, the Deputy Special Representative of the Commission Chairperson
to Somalia (D/SRCC) at the African Union Commission based in Mogadishu
to gain a perspective on the state of the mission.
What are some key lessons that AMISOM has learned over the course of the last decade?
Although AMISOM is often called a peacekeeping or peace enforcement
mission, in fact, AMISOM is a combat mission fighting a terrorist
insurgency in Somalia. When it first deployed to Somalia in 2007,
Islamist militants controlled most of Somalia and large swaths of the
capital, Mogadishu. AMISOM’s first task was to push al Shabaab out of
the capital and create conditions in which the Transitional Federal
Government could operate. It initially used a traditional peacekeeping approach:
staying encamped, conducting limited patrols, and returning fire only
when fired upon. This model was quickly abandoned when al Shabaab began
launching attacks on the AMISOM encampments. In 2011, AMISOM began an
operation that dislodged al Shabaab from Mogadishu’s central business
district and flushed them out of the country’s main supply routes and
regional centers. By 2017, al Shabaab had been expelled from most of its
strongholds in southern Somalia. Along the way, AMISOM troops took
significant casualties. The deadliest attack occurred in 2016, when as
many as 140 AU troops were killed in a single assault.
AMISOM’s gains in the field could never have been realized if it had
continued to rely on the traditional peacekeeping template. Ours is
probably the deadliest mission of its kind anywhere in the world, and
our troops and civilians have had to adapt, through trial and error, to
the unique challenges of the Somalia context. Initially, we expected
AMISOM to eventually transition to a hybrid UN/AU mission or a full UN
mission, following the model of the African Mission in Darfur, Burundi,
and others. This could not happen in Somalia because the environment has
remained extremely fluid. Across Africa, peacekeepers are increasingly
being deployed to highly fragile political and security environments,
and the main challenge will be to adapt existing doctrines to reflect
this reality. AMISOM’s experience offers valuable lessons in this
regard.
What are the main challenges and constraints facing the mission?
Al Shabaab uses conventional warfare tactics in combination with
urban warfare, guerilla warfare, and terrorism. In September 2017 for
instance, al Shabaab fighters used car bombs and coordinated mortar attacks
to overrun a Somali army base, killing eight soldiers. Two weeks later,
they carried out a devastating bombing in the center of Mogadishu,
involving a truck packed with 600 kilograms of highly sophisticated and homemade explosives. In November, al Shabaab militants ambushed a convoy
carrying a regional governor in central Somalia, killing two soldiers.
No explosives were used in that attack. In January, they killed 38
people in two car bomb blasts
followed by heavy rocket and mortar fire outside the presidential
palace. This ability to employ and deploy different tactics and
capabilities in successive waves of attacks shows that al Shabaab is
highly adaptive and resilient.
The other challenge AMISOM faces is in the area of logistics. The
United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) is only authorized to
transport non-lethal assistance and troops to designated points known as
battalion hubs. The transportation of war supplies and the onward
transfer of troops from the battalion hubs to the field is the
responsibility of the troop-contributing country.
However, AMISOM’s airlift capabilities are miniscule: it has only
three utility helicopters to cover its entire area of operation. While
there have been offers of additional aerial assets, the rate at which
the UN reimburses countries willing to supply and maintain them is low,
making it less attractive for them to put these vital capabilities at
our disposal. Logistics are therefore unreliable and erratic, and our
troops are overstretched and unable to secure the expansive territory
and protect their supply lines.
Attempts to improve AMISOM’s supply system have also been hampered by
the incompatibility of doctrine. UNSOA’s capabilities are civilian, not
military. As such, they are structured to provide logistics in a
traditional peacekeeping mission and not for combat environment. Strict
restrictions on where UNSOA assets can land, for instance, have made the
evacuation of our troops extremely difficult.
AMISOM operates in a “contingent-centric” environment where
everything—from troop deployment to equipment—is controlled by the
troop-contributing country and not the mission. As a result, force
commanders do not have leeway to direct their own forces, which can
delay or even hamper operations.
Additionally, AMISOM lacks force enablers and force multipliers. A
force enabler is a capability such as transportation or communications
that contributes to the success of a mission. A force multiplier, on the
other hand, is a combination of capabilities that greatly increase
military effectiveness, such as combat aircraft, infantry fighting
vehicles, and heavy artillery. AMISOM still lacks the requisite force
enablers and multipliers to effectively deliver on its mandate. This
hampers its ability to hold liberated areas.
Finally, al Shabaab has much better access to intelligence than
AMISOM given its links to the population under its control, its
immersion in the local culture and language, and its knowledge of the
terrain. Al Shabaab’s formidable intelligence apparatus, the Amniyat, has greatly increased al Shabaab’s resilience as well as its ability to anticipate and plan.
How would you characterize the progress made in building the Somali National Army (SNA)?
Efforts to build the Somali National Army date back to 2007. The
SNA’s core weakness stems from the collapse of the Somali government in
1991 when the military splintered along clan lines. Today, rival clans
are the primary sources of recruits and clan divisions remain pervasive
in the force. The government’s 2017 Operational Readiness Assessment
lays bare the logistical, financial, and operational gaps facing the
military. Among other things, it found that 30 percent of soldiers in
the bases do not have weapons. Furthermore, the army lacks vehicles,
communications, and shelter. Some soldiers live in the bush. Very little
has been done to address the report’s findings.
Training for the SNA is mainly provided by Turkey, the United States,
and United Kingdom. A United Arab Emirates (UAE) program that had
trained and paid some SNA troops since 2014 was recently halted after a
dispute between the government and the semiautonomous regions of
Jubaland and Puntland, which leased their ports to the UAE without
Mogadishu’s authorization. This violated Somalia’s policy of neutrality
in the ongoing Gulf rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Somalia cut military ties with the UAE in protest.
About 800 soldiers finish their training each year under the Turkish,
U.S., and UK training programs. This number is too low for the SNA to
be able to conduct effective operations. Somalia needs about 50,000
well-trained troops if it is to take over its own security after AMISOM
leaves in 2020, according to the recently approved Transition Plan.
Additionally, the training is not coordinated, and the partners have
not developed common standards, doctrine, and curricula. The SNA will
require a professional and well-developed officer corps with the
leadership, discipline, and equipment that coordinated training is meant
to achieve.
What non-military tasks does AMISOM undertake and how do they support the mission’s larger goals?
When we began dislodging al Shabaab from its strongholds, the
population came to our bases in droves seeking medical attention, food,
and security in their areas, and even assistance in solving disputes. It
became clear to us that al Shabaab’s residual popular support in many
of these communities was due to the semblance of order and services it
provided. Communities tolerated them because public services were
nonexistent after the state collapsed in 1991, and there was a general
state of lawlessness where warlords preyed on the population with
impunity. The Ugandans, who had deployed to Somalia before AMISOM was
established, stepped in to provide medical doctors and veterinarians to
meet some of the needs, but this became untenable and diverted troops
away from their core tasks. That is when we prioritized the need to
develop a strong civilian component as a critical part of the overall
mission.
Today, AMISOM deploys about 70 civilian peacekeepers at the community
level to serve as a link with the local population. They undertake a
range of activities, including political affairs, gender mainstreaming,
public information dissemination, counter propaganda, legislative
reform, and security sector reform. All these are aimed at developing
the government’s capacity to deliver services and consolidate its local
support. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) has a
civilian component of about 500 people but operates mainly in Mogadishu
and some regional centers due to security restrictions. AMISOM staff, on
the other hand, operate more freely and have greater access in the
field. There is a need for the AU and UN to work more closely together
to better leverage UNSOM’s superior resources and AMISOM’s flexibility
to enhance our civilian work.
How do you see the future of the mission changing, and what does success look like?
AMISOM was founded in the spirit of resolving African problems using
African solutions. The Somali government needs to become efficient and
accountable to its people. It can only do that if it commits itself to
pursuing local development rather than remaining reliant on foreign
assistance. On the military side, AMISOM requires more support to
address its operational and logistical needs. The AU’s quest to access
assured and predictable sources of funding remains a major challenge.
The continental approach to addressing conflicts coupled with the
willingness of African countries to put their professional and
dependable troops in harm’s way should be steadfastly supported by the
UN. This is because in situations like Somalia the AU is carrying the
burden of the UN Security Council, which is the custodian of
international peace and security. The lack of predictable financing has
compelled the AU to endure the consequences of partners whose interests
and priorities may not always be in tandem with those of the region.
The current drawdown of force AMISOM force levels has been criticized
by troop contributing countries as counterproductive given the increased threat level
in a huge operational area. There is a fear that the planned annual
reduction that started in December 2017 may compromise the gains made so
far and even lead to the mission’s defeat. For the current transition
strategy to succeed AMISOM needs to partner with credible, professional,
and capable Somali security forces that are loyal to a democratic,
accountable, and legitimate government. Some progress has been made in
these areas, but there is still a long way to go.
Additional Resources
- Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams, “The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU’s Experience in Somalia,” International Peace Institute, May 10, 2016.
- John L Hirsch, “Reigniting Somalia’s Political Transition: Q&A with Ken Menkhaus,” Global Observatory, November 25, 2015.
- Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, “Strategic Options for the Future of African Peace Operations 2015–2025,” Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Seminar Report No. 1, 2015.
- Daniel Hampton, “Creating Sustainable Peacekeeping Capability in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief No. 27, April 30, 2014.
- Emile Ouédraogo, “Advancing Military Professionalism in Africa,”Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Research Paper No. 6, July 2014.
- Michael Olufemi Sodipo, “Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief No. 26, August 31, 2013.
- Paul D. Williams, “Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned Since 2000,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief No. 25, July 2013.